When Public Safety Opens Doors: My Take on Dr. Gustavo Flores-Macías’s Elite Taxation Theory

When I first picked up Dr. Gustavo A. Flores-Macías’s “Contemporary State Building: Elite Taxation and Public Safety in Latin America,” I expected an academic exploration of taxation in Latin America. What I found, however, was a deeply engaging and insightful study that reshaped my understanding of the delicate interplay between state power, elite cooperation, and public safety. The book tackles one of the most persistent dilemmas in Latin American politics: how weak governments, often struggling with corruption and limited capacity, can compel economic elites historically notorious for avoiding taxes to contribute to public coffers, particularly for public safety initiatives.

From the outset, I was drawn to the book’s central premise, which challenges conventional wisdom in state-building literature. Many studies attribute the capacity of governments to tax elites to factors like resource dependence, income inequality, or general institutional strength. Dr. Flores-Macías, however, offers a compelling alternative: elite taxation often emerges in response to acute public safety crises. These crises act as “windows of opportunity,” creating incentives for elites to cooperate with governments, even in environments where distrust runs high. I found this perspective both refreshing and convincing, as it situates taxation not merely as an economic or bureaucratic process but as a politically strategic response to pressing societal threats.

Watch Podcast: Elite Taxation and Public Safety: Lessons from Contemporary Latin America

One of the aspects I appreciated most about this book is its meticulous empirical foundation. Dr. Flores-Macías draws on a rich array of Latin American case studies, particularly Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Mexico to illustrate how elite taxation policies have been designed and implemented under varying institutional conditions. I was struck by how he navigates the complexities of each case, identifying not only the policy outcomes but also the nuanced interactions between governments and business elites. For example, his examination of Colombia’s local taxation experiments demonstrated that the success of these initiatives often hinges on establishing credible channels of accountability and forging strong business-government linkages. Reading these sections, I felt as though I were witnessing real-time negotiations between state actors and the economic elite, which brought the theoretical arguments vividly to life.

Professor Flores-Macías’s discussion of mistrust and corruption resonated deeply with me. As someone who studies governance in developing contexts, I am acutely aware that elite resistance to taxation is rarely about unwillingness to contribute to society in the abstract. Rather, it is deeply tied to perceptions of government legitimacy and the fear that their contributions will be mismanaged. The author’s insistence that building trust and institutional credibility is central to successful elite taxation was, in my view, one of the book’s most important insights. His argument that elite cooperation is more likely when governments can demonstrate a commitment to public safety, accountability, and transparency made intuitive sense, and I found myself reflecting on parallels in other regions where state legitimacy is contested.

'In Contemporary State Building Gustavo Flores-Macías takes on two issues generally treated separately: responses to insecurity and the politics of taxation. In a masterful work Flores-Macías uses precisely this juxtaposition to show how even weak states can sometimes effectively tax elites to provide public goods.' - Marcus Kurtz, The Ohio State University, author of Free Market Democracy and the Chilean and Mexican Countryside and Latin American State Building in Comparative Perspective: Social Foundations of Institutional Order

I also admired the theoretical contributions Dr. Flores-Macías makes. He develops a model that synthesizes political opportunity structures, elite incentives, and state capacity in a way that is both elegant and practical. Unlike many political science texts that remain purely descriptive, this book provides a conceptual toolkit for understanding why some governments succeed in taxing elites and others fail. I found this approach particularly useful because it bridges the gap between theory and policy. It offers actionable insights for policymakers seeking to strengthen state capacity in environments where traditional instruments of fiscal coercion are ineffective.

Another strength of the book is its writing style. Despite the dense subject matter, Dr. Flores-Macías writes with clarity and precision. I was able to navigate complex arguments about taxation, institutional capacity, and elite bargaining without feeling overwhelmed. The book balances theoretical sophistication with readability, which made it accessible not only to scholars but also to practitioners interested in governance and public finance. I often found myself highlighting passages and jotting notes, eager to revisit his explanations of how public safety crises can catalyze elite compliance.

If I were to offer a critique, it would be that some sections occasionally assume a high level of familiarity with Latin American political institutions. While the case studies are rich and illuminating, readers unfamiliar with regional politics may need to pause and contextualize certain historical or institutional references. That said, this is a minor concern in an otherwise exceptionally well-researched and cogent study.

What I find most compelling about Contemporary State Building is its broader applicability. While the book focuses on Latin America, the mechanisms Dr. Flores-Macías identifies elite bargaining, trust-building, and crisis-driven policy windows have relevance for state-building efforts across the developing world. I left the book with a renewed appreciation for the subtle interplay between political opportunity and elite incentives, and with the recognition that successful state-building requires more than legislation or enforcement it requires strategic engagement with the very actors who are often seen as obstacles.

'Flores-Macías has once again made an important contribution to our understanding of elites and the state in Latin America. Policymakers, political theorists, students, elites, and activists would be wise to consider the lessons of this work in devising their strategies for building viable states, addressing crises of development, and pursuing justice.' - Aaron Schneider, University of Denver, author of State-Building and Tax Regimes in Central America

In conclusion, reading this book was an intellectually stimulating experience that challenged my assumptions about taxation, governance, and state capacity. Prof. Gustavo Flores-Macías offers a nuanced, empirically grounded, and theoretically sophisticated account of how weak states can extract resources from powerful economic actors to enhance public safety. I would recommend this book to scholars of political science, economics, and public policy, as well as to practitioners seeking evidence-based strategies for governance in fragile states. Personally, it has reshaped the way I think about the relationship between elites, the state, and society, and I expect that its insights will continue to inform my research and reflections on state-building for years to come.

The book is available for purchase from Cambridge University Press. Click here to get your copy.

To learn more about Dr. Gustavo A. Flores-Macías’s research, click here

Disclaimer: The perspectives expressed in this book review reflect the reviewer’s own intellectual views and interpretations.